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 This study examines the impact of accounting harmonization on cross-border 
capital market contagion.  Employing a sample of approximately 14,000 firms across 35 
countries for the period 2001-2010, I document an increase in cross-border contagion 
amongst IFRS adopting markets.  After controlling for common macro-level exposures 
and bilateral trade linkages, I find significant clustering in the incidence of extreme 
negative market returns across IFRS adopting countries, relative to the clustering 
observed across non-adopting countries.  Providing further insight, I show that liquidity 
shocks—captured by the volatility of liquidity—originating in foreign markets have a 
significantly greater impact on the variability of local market liquidity when both the 
foreign and local markets follow IFRS.  Cross-sectional analysis of IFRS adopters shows 
my documented contagion results are more pronounced within countries that 
experienced the greatest increase in foreign portfolio investment around the adoption of 
IFRS.  Conversely, the observed impact of foreign liquidity shocks on local markets is 
attenuated in countries that experienced the greatest increase in reporting transparency 
post-IFRS adoption. These results are robust to several sensitivity tests and alternative 
specifications.  Taken together, the evidence presented in this study suggests that equity 
market integration associated with IFRS adoption also imposes a significant market cost 







The wide-spread adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
facilitated the harmonization of accounting standards around the globe.  Accounting 
research has documented a variety of financial reporting, capital market, and 
contracting outcomes associated with the adoption of IFRS (see Bruggemann et al. 
[2012] for a review).  One particularly well documented outcome is the integration of 
capital markets via increases in cross-border equity investment and the globalization of 
investor bases (e.g., Amiram [2012], Florou and Pope [2012], Yu [2011]).  Existing 
literature suggests that this has been beneficial to adopting firms, citing an increase in 
market liquidity, greater access to capital, and improvements in investor information 
environments.  However, while prior accounting research has focused on these benefits, 
a long line of research (primarily in economics and finance) argues that as equity 
markets become more integrated they are increasingly exposed to the risk of cross-
border capital market contagion (e.g. Bekaert et al. [2005]).  The objective of this study 
is to examine whether the global convergence of accounting practices is associated with 
increases in the risk of cross-border equity market contagion.  Specifically, I document 




equity markets following the harmonization of their respective accounting standards, i.e. 
when both countries follow IFRS.  Given the increased co-movement is isolated to 
periods of significant market downturn I interpret this clustering as evidence of cross-
border contagion, suggesting the harmonization of accounting standards carries a 
significant capital market cost.     
Cross-border contagion arises when adverse localized shocks in one capital market 
are transmitted to other markets beyond what economic fundamentals would suggest 
(Pritsker [2001]; Bekaert et al. [2005]).  Cross-border contagion imposes significant costs 
on domestic markets by reducing the effects of local policy, increasing volatility, and 
effectively opening them up to the risk of foreign shocks (Bekaert et al. [2005]).  
Interestingly, such concerns were raised by a number of countries initially opposed to 
the adoption of IFRS.  For instance Japan and a number of Latin American countries 
explicitly cited the potential introduction of excess volatility in their markets brought 
about by risky foreign capital flows as one of the reasons to temporarily or permanently 
delay the adoption of IFRS.       
I argue that the harmonization of accounting standards increases the risk of cross-
border contagion among IFRS adopting markets mainly due to the mixing of investor 
bases, illustrated via two main channels.  First, it has been shown that investors respond 
to localized market shocks (e.g., liquidity) by selling or rebalancing their holdings in 
other markets (Brunnermeier and Pederson [2009], Kyle and Xiong [2001], Pritsker and 




traded in those markets, unrelated to their fundamentals.  To the extent that investors 
hold globalized portfolios they will transmit local adverse shocks to the foreign markets 
in which they invest and contagion will ensue.  Given IFRS adoption has been shown to 
promote significant cross-border investment among adopting markets, this mixing of 
investor bases likely exacerbates this channel of cross-border contagion. 
Second, harmonizing the accounting practices of many countries provides 
investors the means to extrapolate financial information across national borders.  Prior 
studies suggest investors perceive IFRS adoption to increase comparability (DeFond et 
al. [2011]), however it remains unclear as to whether this increased comparability better 
captures the true fundamental correlation between firms.  This suggests that contagion 
may also propagate when global investors extract different signals from country-specific 
adverse shocks and overestimate the potential effect on other countries (Pritsker [2001], 
Claessens and Forbes [2001]), thus increasing the risk of contagion amongst IFRS 
adopters.   
It is important to note that in my setting contagion is characterized independent 
of the evolution of fundamentals.  Therefore, the co-movement in prices I observe 
requires downward sloping demand curves, contrary to the traditional assumptions of 
the CAPM.1   
I employ two established empirical measures to capture cross-border contagion.  
First, I follow a more traditional empirical definition of contagion (e.g. Bekaert et al. 
                                                          





[2005], Boyson et al. [2010]), and study the excess correlation among market returns 
around extreme negative events, i.e. market returns in the bottom decile of their 
respective time-series distribution.  Consistent with prior literature, I term this “worst 
return” contagion.  Importantly, I utilize excess returns that are orthogonal to changes 
in global risk factors or country-level fundamentals, consistent with my working 
definition of contagion.  This empirical characterization allows me to capture 
differences in the clustering of excess returns among markets around extreme negative 
return periods.  The next part of my identification strategy exploits variation in country 
level adoption dates to capture whether IFRS adoption exacerbates the observed cross-
border contagion, relative to a non-adopting baseline.  If harmonization of accounting 
standards exacerbates cross-border contagion, I expect the excess co-movement in worst 
returns amongst IFRS adopting countries to exceed that observed amongst other 
countries.  This design also provides comfort that results are implicitly driven by my 
channel of interest, i.e., the mixing of investor bases among IFRS adopting countries, in 
that focusing on negative return periods provides a binding constraint (e.g. margin calls, 
or general consumption needs) on globalized investors’ to trade within their portfolios 
to cover their losses, hence I capture short-run clustering in negative returns among 
markets.  
Second, I examine an established mechanism underpinning the propagation of 
return contagion, namely the spread of liquidity shocks across markets (“liquidity 




measures of liquidity volatility (e.g., Rigobon [2003], Maffett and Lang [2012]), and 
examine the differential association between foreign and local market level liquidity 
variability among IFRS and non-IFRS adopting markets.3  To the extent that adverse 
liquidity shocks are more easily transmitted across national borders following the 
harmonization of accounting standards, I expect to observe that the relation between 
changes in the liquidity of local and foreign markets will be much more pronounced 
following the adoption of IFRS.  Moreover, after controlling for bilateral economic and 
trade linkages that might explain variation in foreign equity investment flows, I expect 
that the impact of foreign liquidity shocks on local markets will be much more 
pronounced between IFRS adopting countries relative to non-adopting countries.   
I test my predictions using a dataset of weekly data from approximately 14,000 
firms located within 35 countries for the period 2001-2010.  A feature of my design is 
that I limit my sample to locally traded stocks and remove corporations that are traded 
on multiple exchanges before computing my country-level return and liquidity 
measures.  This ensures my results are not simply driven by the subset of large firms 
whose prices tend to move more with shifts in macro fundamentals, or cross-listed firms 
who are more likely to have globalized investor bases independent of the adoption of 
IFRS.4     
                                                          
3 While the measurement of much broader notions of return contagion is hotly debated (see Forbes 
[2012] for an excellent review), there is a greater consensus in the literature regarding the well-
established proxies that capture liquidity volatility, allowing for a cleaner research design to further 
corroborate evidence of cross-border contagion.     
4 In addition, this also addresses recent calls for greater insight into IFRS impacts on smaller firms 




Consistent with my first prediction, I document an increased worst return 
contagion amongst IFRS countries immediately following the passage of IFRS, over and 
above that experienced by non-adopting countries.  Results suggest that IFRS adopting 
jurisdictions exhibit an average of 42% more clustering of worst returns, relative to non-
adopting countries, meaning that IFRS adopters are significantly more likely to 
experience negative price movements due to cross-border contagion.  Moreover, the 
clustering is only weakly evident – almost four times smaller – in upside returns (i.e. 
returns in the top decile of their return distributions) suggesting that my documented 
contagion result is not simply a shift in cross-market interdependence between 
countries, but concentrated clustering during negative states of the world.  Consistent 
with my second prediction, I find that liquidity shocks originating in foreign markets 
are associated with a significantly greater impact—approximately twice as large—on the 
variability of local market liquidity when both foreign and local markets follow IFRS.  
These findings suggest that IFRS adoption exposes domestic markets to an increased 
risk of contagion, as local returns and liquidity are now more susceptible to volatility 
stemming from adverse foreign market conditions, unrelated to local fundamentals.  
The increased comovement across markets likely harms investors by increasing the 
volatility of markets and reducing the benefits of international diversification.5 
                                                          
5 Interestingly, when I construct country level indexes based only on cross-listed firms – which are 
removed from my final sample – the cross-country correlations between pairs of IFRS adopters and 
pairs of non-adopters reveal no significant increases (or decreases) in contagion.  This is consistent 
with the mechanism argued in this paper in that these firms already have globalized investor bases, 




To gain further insight and corroborate my main findings, I test the relation 
between the cross-sectional variation in the intensity of observed cross-border contagion 
and the country specific effects of accounting harmonization.  First, given that the 
extent of foreign investment is a key ingredient underpinning the propagation of 
liquidity shocks through wealth effects, I expect the observed strength of cross-border 
contagion to be more pronounced in countries that experienced the greatest increase in 
foreign investment following IFRS adoption (i.e., an integration effect).  Consistent with 
this prediction, cross-sectional analysis reveals that the documented cross-border 
contagion effects are more pronounced—two to five times the magnitude—within 
countries that experienced the greatest increase in foreign portfolio investment (FPI) 
around the adoption of IFRS.  This evidence suggests that the benefits associated with 
additional access to foreign capital (i.e. the documented increase in liquidity levels in 
Daske et al. [2008]) come with a significant cost as globalized investor bases of local 
firms and markets increase their exposure to adverse foreign market shocks.  In 
addition, given the partitioning variable is FPI changes immediately following the 
adoption of IFRS, such a result also provides comfort that the observed contagion is 
likely attributable to the process of accounting harmonization.   
Second, as IFRS is generally seen to be of higher reporting quality and more 
transparent than local GAAP (Li [2010], Barth et al. [2008]), I expect the observed 
contagion results to be attenuated for firms in countries which experienced the greatest 
                                                                                                                                                                       
firms reveals they experience significantly smaller increases in foreign institutional ownership relative 





increase in transparency post-IFRS.  This prediction is motivated by theory that suggests 
that asset transparency (i.e., transparent financial reporting) may mitigate the spread of 
liquidity shocks.  Specifically, when faced with a liquidity shock, investors will exhibit a 
“flight to quality” and shy away from assets about which they are more uncertain 
regarding fundamental value.  To the extent that IFRS better maps to economic 
fundamentals and increases the transparency of financial information relative to 
previous accounting standards, investors will be less likely to liquidate holdings in firms 
from IFRS adopting markets when forced to re-balance.  Partitioning the sample into 
high and low transparency countries I document that the observed clustering in worst 
returns and the incremental impact of foreign liquidity shocks on local markets is 
significantly attenuated—an almost four-fold decrease—in countries with the greatest 
post-IFRS transparency.6  Taken together, my empirical findings are consistent with an 
economically significant capital market cost imposed on IFRS adopting markets in the 
form of cross-border contagion.     
However, my results must be interpreted with some caution given the following 
caveats.  As with most studies examining the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption, the 
clustering of mandated adoption dates in time make it difficult to eliminate the 
confounding effects of unrelated economic shocks, trade linkages, and changes in 
institutions.  That said, my design attempts to mitigate these concerns by: (1) filtering 
                                                          
6 Adding validity to my inferences on incremental effect of IFRS reporting transparency, I find 
insignificant difference across my sub-samples in the overall average effect of transparency on cross-
border contagion measures for IFRS adopters, suggesting unobserved heterogeneity across my sub-




returns for common exposures and macro fundamentals, (2) controlling for trade 
linkages and enforcement regimes, and (3) leveraging variation in adoption dates by 
incorporating adopting and non-adopting countries outside the E.U.  In addition, my 
cross-sectional tests are introduced to provide evidence of plausible cross-sectional 
variation in the intensity of cross-border contagion related to country-specific IFRS 
impacts resulting from the process of accounting harmonization.  Further, my 
inferences are robust to both E.U. and non-E.U. countries, and are robust to the 
removal of countries identified as having concurrent changes in enforcement.  Lastly, 
while I empirically document evidence of contagion among IFRS adopting markets, this 
paper is silent on the overall welfare effects of the IFRS mandate.  That is, my results 
should not be viewed in isolation from other studies that document significant capital 
market benefits of IFRS adoption. 
A potential threat to the internal validity of this study also arises if, at the country 
level, the decision to adopt IFRS may have been part of larger integration policy and it 
is these other liberalization policies adopted around the time of IFRS that is driving the 
observed contagion (see Ramanna and Sletten [2012] for an excellent discussion of 
country level adoption factors).  While I acknowledge the potential issue of endogeneity, 
I attempt to control for observable characteristics correlated with the economic trends 
(that may have given rise to adoption) between countries in order to isolate the impact 




between the decision to adopt IFRS and the current or expected foreign trade and 
investment flows.   
Notwithstanding, this study contributes to the literature in four distinct ways.  
First, I document an important consequence of the integration of equity markets 
facilitated by IFRS adoption. My results are consistent with IFRS opening up local 
markets to foreign sources of risk, particularly return contagion and the associated 
spread of foreign liquidity shocks.  Second, my empirical analysis builds on emerging 
research suggesting that firms reporting under IFRS or US GAAP are shielded from 
market level liquidity shocks (Lang and Maffett [2011]).  While a global investor base 
may provide a benefit for firms in the presence of localized liquidity shocks, it may prove 
to be significantly detrimental, from a market perspective, in the presence of foreign 
liquidity shocks.  Third, the results in this study are salient to recent debates over the 
diversification afforded by international portfolio strategies.  While correlations among 
international equity returns have generally been low, my results suggest that the wide 
spread adoption of IFRS may reduce the country-level diversification benefits of 
international portfolio investment.  Moreover, the nature of the documented contagion 
in returns means that precisely when diversification should offer the most benefit to 
investors (i.e., market downturns) the correlation in returns across IFRS adopting 
countries is the strongest.     
Finally, prior studies tend to focus on the relation between IFRS and average level 




increase in market liquidity immediately following adoption.  However, the much 
broader concern for investors is not simply the average level of liquidity, but its 
variability and uncertainty (Persuad [2003]).  My results suggest that liquidity variability 
increases post-IFRS adoption, as local markets are more susceptible to adverse liquidity 
shocks in foreign markets.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the prior literature 
with respect to IFRS adoption and market integration, and also defines my notion of 
cross-border contagion; section 3 discusses the relevant research designs for my return 
and liquidity contagion tests; section 4 describes the data collection process; section 5 





Background and Predictions 
 
2.1. IFRS and market integration 
A number of studies have argued that cross-border contagion arises as markets 
become more integrated.  Therefore, a necessary condition for accounting 
harmonization to increase cross-border contagion is that it must integrate the capital 
markets.  In line with this, I briefly summarize the literature and evidence on IFRS 
adoption and cross-border equity market investment.        
Traditional understanding of the observed (low) levels of cross-border equity 
investment was based on the premise that local investors have an informational 
advantage over foreign investors (Kang and Stulz [1997]).  Accounting impacts the level 
of cross-border investment as significant differences in financial reporting standards may 
exacerbate this information asymmetry.  Investors have to devote significant amounts of 
time and effort to decoding foreign Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(“GAAP”), and thus will incur greater costs than local investors and be at an 
informational disadvantage when investing in countries with different accounting 
standards (Chen et al. [2011]).  Existing literature argues convergence in accounting 




investors (e.g., Bradshaw et al. [2004]).  Following this logic, IFRS adoption will move 
foreign stocks into investors’ choice sets by replacing unfamiliar country-specific 
reporting standards with a single set of standards that investors are able to familiarize 
themselves with at a lower cost; reducing the differential costs between foreign and local 
investors (Yu [2011]), and allowing foreign investors to be more confident in their 
ability to assess foreign markets (Amiram [2012]).  In addition, IFRS are generally seen 
to be of higher quality than local GAAP (Barth et al. [2008]); this may further reduce 
the information asymmetry between local and foreign investors, and increase foreign 
investment within IFRS adopting countries.        
 Empirical evidence consistent with these arguments begins with Covrig 
et al. [2008] who show that foreign mutual funds significantly increase their ownership 
in firms that voluntarily switch to IAS, while domestic mutual funds do not.7  Similar 
results are also observed following the mandatory adoption of IFRS (e.g., Yu [2011] and 
Florou and Pope [2012]), with the most pronounced increase in foreign investment 
experienced by those countries which were most dissimilar pre-convergence, and those 
having the strongest enforcement institutions in place.  Consistent with these 
investment patterns, DeFond et al. [2011] provides evidence that the preference of 
international (institutional) investors towards IFRS is due to increased comparability.  
                                                          
7 Note that IAS were issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) until 
2001.  The IASC was then succeeded by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) who 
issue IFRS.  These IFRS include those issued not only by the IASB but also by the IASC, some of 
which have been amended by the IASB.  Throughout this paper, I use the acronym IFRS to describe 





Building on this result, Jayaraman and Verdi [2013] find that accounting comparability 
is, at least partially, associated with greater cross-border arm’s length financing, 
indicating that the extent of bilateral investment and the extent of accounting 
comparability may be reinforcing.      
  Switching to retail investor trade data, Bruggemann et al. [2012] find retail 
investors located within an IFRS adopting jurisdiction exhibit a preference for foreign 
stocks that also adopt IFRS.8  While Amiram [2012] takes a broader perspective using 
country-level Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) data, and finds a significant increase in 
cross-border investment between IFRS adopting countries after controlling for bilateral 
trade linkages.  A result he attributes to familiarity of accounting standards.   
In addition to equity investment outcomes, studies have also shown that the 
harmonization of accounting standards has enabled other users the ability to extrapolate 
financial information across national borders.  For instance, Alves et al. [2008] shows 
that following the adoption of IFRS, equity analysts are increasingly using globally-
defined peer groups in place of the same country comparators when implementing 
multiples-based valuation methods.  While anecdotal evidence suggests that investors 
and compensation committees are also redefining and expanding peer groups when 
evaluating CEO performance.   
                                                          
8 Interestingly, this effect is limited to international stocks that grab retail investors’ attention, 
consistent with Merton [1987].  In the case of individual investors, cross-border investment does not 





Overall, there is a growing empirical consensus that IFRS adoption is associated 
with financial markets integration, as evidenced by the direct increase in cross-border 
equity investments amongst IFRS adopters and the ability of investors to evaluate 
investments on a global perspective.  Moreover, the globalization of investor bases 
appears to be attributable to both institutional and retail investors.       
  
2.2. Market integration and cross-border contagion  
Financial markets have long been recognized as major avenues for contagion.  
Despite the wide array of literature on this subject matter within finance and 
economics, there is no consensus economic definition or consensus empirical 
interpretation of what constitutes contagion.   Contagion, in general, refers to the 
spread of market disturbances (almost exclusively on the downside and around crises) 
from one country to the other in the form of co-movements in exchange rates, stock 
prices, sovereign spreads and capital flows (see Karolyi [2003] and Forbes [2012] for a 
review).9   
                                                          
9  Contagion represents a significant risk to the financial stability of banking systems and equity 
markets worldwide.  Traditional macro-economic theory can rationalize cross-border co-movement 
between economically-linked countries, i.e. trade partners, however the bulk of observed co-
movement had been concentrated during periods of crises, between economically developing 
markets that are relatively weakly economically linked.  Overall, empirical observation has found the 
pattern of contagion to be uneven across both time and countries, and somewhat unexplained by 
traditional macro theories.  For instance, even accounting for the release of economic news and 
other information (assuming co-movement is financial markets responding to the same public news 
events), much of the increased volatility and co-movement remains unexplained (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 1999; Connolly and Wang, 2000).  In response, a literature was born with the objective 
of explaining the observed co-movement and excess volatility that accompanies extreme negative 




This study focuses on the non-fundamentals-based view of contagion.10  Under 
this view, co-movements are associated with investor or other agents’ global trading 
behavior in response to local shocks, such as financial panic, loss of confidence, and 
incorrect cross-country inferences due to imperfect information (Kodres and Pritsker 
[2002]).  For instance, adverse market conditions (e.g. panic, loss of confidence, funding 
liquidity shock) prompting sales in an afflicted country may lead investors to liquidate 
investments in healthy markets to cover their losses or recalibrate their portfolios.  
Along these lines, I view contagion as negative events in a foreign country, outside of 
local economic fundamentals, that spread and have deleterious effects on home 
markets, via investor trading (Forbes [2012]).  
 Prior literature documents that market integration plays a key role in the 
propagation of contagion among equity markets.  Bekaert et al. [2005] show that more 
integrated markets, i.e. those with greater level of foreign investment and great number 
of trade and financial linkages, experience greater correlation in returns during crises 
periods.  Forbes [2012] examines contagion over time, and finds that that the incidence 
of contagion (i.e., negative return coincidence) doubled from 1981 through 2009.  
Generally, these studies employ probability analysis (i.e. logit and quantile regression) in 
conjunction with multivariate extreme value theory to test whether tail observations in 
returns are correlated across countries.  Taken together, this literature concludes that as 
                                                          
10 The fundamentals-based reasons seek to explain contagion through emphasizing co-movements in 
stock prices that result from the macroeconomic interdependence due to real economic linkages, e.g. 




markets become more integrated, countries are more likely to experience negative 
returns simultaneously.     
Traditionally, two prevailing channels have been put forward to explain the 
spread of contagion, (1) correlated information channel; and (2) the liquidity shock 
channel.  Beginning with the correlated information channel, it has been shown that in 
a world with imperfect public information (not unlike the current reality), a real shock 
in country i that would have otherwise have no effect on country j can have a significant 
effect on j’s financial markets (Pritsker [2001]). That is, a negative shock in country i will 
lower prices in i’s financial markets, but investors in country j will not be able to discern 
whether price decline in market i reflects information that is relevant for market j, but 
because of the possibility that it is relevant, a price decline in market i will cause a price 
decline in market j. Thus under correlated information transmission, contagion spreads 
as price changes in one market have perceived implications for the values in other 
markets (Longstaff [2010]), investors trading induces co-movement in prices regardless 
of whether the extrapolated news is relevant or not.11   
The other potential channel for the propagation of return contagion is the 
spread of foreign liquidity shocks.  It is this channel that will be the primary focus of the 
paper.  When investors in one market suffer a localized liquidity shock, to obtain 
liquidity, they will sell or rebalance their assets in a number of other markets; putting 
                                                          
11 It is important to note that the notion of correlated information here refers to the extrapolation of 
information regarding one market or firm to another.  There doesn’t necessarily have to be an 
economic justification for this extrapolation, only that investors perceive this to be the case.  This 
can also manifest itself as enthusiasm or weariness about certain stocks and markets that is 




pressure on foreign market prices (unrelated to their fundamentals) leading to depressed 
prices and liquidity crunches (e.g., Allen and Gale [2000], Kodres and Pritsker [2002]).12 
Analytically, Kyle and Xiong [2001] and Yuan [2005] show that wealth-constrained 
investors who lose money may need to liquidate positions in multiple countries, thereby 
spreading a liquidity crunch from one country to others. Providing empirical evidence, 
Bekaert et al. [2007] show that innovations in local market liquidity are a significant 
driver of expected returns and liquidity levels in foreign markets, especially in markets 
where foreign investment is high.  More directly, Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and 
Ramadorai [2009] find evidence that investment funds respond to outflows, (e.g., 
following a shock to their investor base) by changing their portfolio allocation across 
markets which significantly impacts market equity returns and increases market co-
movement.   
Interestingly, these two channels are not mutually exclusive.  Kodres & Pritsker 
[2002] propose a model that folds in these two established channels, but also seeks to 
explain some of the empirical inconsistencies, i.e. the fact that contagion is more 
prevalent in emerging countries.  They call this new channel, cross-market re-balancing.  
As with traditional liquidity shock models, investors respond to shocks in one market 
by optimally readjusting their portfolios in other markets, thus transmitting shocks, and 
                                                          
12 In addition, Allen and Gale [2000], and Brunnermeier and Pederson [2009] show that even 
isolated localized liquidity shocks can spread entirely throughout the whole market, as overall market 
liquidity dries up and other asset prices fall reflecting investors’ “flight to quality”, thus impacting 
global investors throughout the economy. These studies demonstrate that investors will respond to 
an exogenous liquidity shock in one market, by selling off assets they hold in other market, and that 
even a small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread by contagion throughout other 




generally contagion.  However, the key insight of their model is that when portfolio 
rebalancing occurs in markets with information asymmetries, the resulting price 
movements are exaggerated because the order flow is misconstrued as being information 
based.   
Overall, both empirical and analytical evidence alike suggests that market 
integration increases the spread of localized shocks throughout other countries and 
facilitates cross-border contagion.  The propagation of shocks is positively associated 
with the extent of foreign equity investment within a market.  Therefore, increasing the 
percentage of foreign investors within a firm’s investor base will necessarily make the 
stock more susceptible to foreign risks (e.g. liquidity shocks) and allow these foreign 
idiosyncratic risks to transmit into the local stock price via trading.  
 
2.3 IFRS and Cross-border contagion  
Given the discussion above, accounting harmonization may exacerbate cross-
border contagion as the widespread adoption IFRS has been shown to reduce the 
barriers to cross-border investment and promote significant foreign equity investment 
within IFRS adopting jurisdictions.  The increased globalization of investor bases 
promoted by IFRS adoption makes local markets more susceptible to foreign risks 
through foreign investor trading in response to their domestic adverse market shocks.  
In addition to the direct transmission of contagion due to foreign investor trading 




national borders between firms and markets. For instance, adverse conditions may lead 
to financial panic in one country may change investors’ beliefs about the financial 
health of another country, causing other investors to withdraw capital for fear of further 
market pressures. In the presence of imperfect information, investors may overweight 
the extent to which they can extrapolate information signals across countries, resulting 
in incorrect cross-inferences (Pasquariello [2007]), and contagion ensues.   
 Accordingly, my main prediction is that cross-border contagion will be 
exacerbated when accounting standards are harmonized representing a significant cost 
to local markets and firms. Moreover, I predict this relation should be stronger in 
countries where IFRS had the greatest impact of the integration of equity markets, i.e. 
greatest increase in foreign investment following IFRS adoption, which I term the 
integration effect. 
 
2.3.1 Reporting transparency and cross-border contagion   
The IASB states that IFRS adoption increases transparency (EC Regulation No. 
1606/2002; McCreevy [2005]), as IFRS is more market-oriented and requires more 
comprehensive disclosures than prior GAAP.  To the extent that greater reporting 
transparency reduces the uncertainty of a firm’s true economic value, the widespread 
adoption of IFRS may actually reduce propagation of cross-border contagion.  The 
rationale can be seen more clearly through the liquidity shock channel, as follows: 




liquidity by reducing private information concerns between investors; concerns that are 
more pronounced during market downturns, precisely when the lack of liquidity is of 
most consequence.  Analytically, Brunnermeier and Pederson [2009], and Vayanos 
[2004], shows that when investors are hit with localized liquidity shocks, they will tend 
to liquidate and sell asset positions that they are most uncertain about (“flight to 
quality”).  Therefore, to the extent that greater financial reporting transparency reduces 
the uncertainty of investors, then it has the potential to reduce the transmission of 
liquidity shocks for stocks with greater transparency.  Empirical studies generally 
provide support for the link between financial reporting transparency and liquidity.13 
I test whether the transparency effect associated with IFRS mitigates the increased 
risk of foreign shocks that manifest through the integration effect.  I predict that 
countries that experienced the greatest increase in reporting quality post-IFRS adoption 
will be most shielded from the increased risk of foreign liquidity shock transmission, 
and incorrect cross-inferences from cross-border extrapolation.   
                                                          
13 A number of empirical studies provide support for a link between financial reporting transparency 
and liquidity, specifically in the context of IFRS adoption, Lang and Maffett [2011] employ IFRS as a 
measure of transparency and find it is associated with lower illiquidity, relative to previous GAAP, 
suggesting financial reporting transparency can shield firms from local adverse liquidity shocks.  
However, Platikanova and Perramon [2009] find significant variation in the strength of correlation 
between changes in liquidity and information asymmetry measures across several E.U. countries 









The objective of this study is to provide evidence that accounting harmonization is 
associated with cross-border contagion.  Towards this end, I examine whether the extent 
to which local markets move more closely with foreign markets during times of significant 
market downturns is exacerbated when both countries follow the same accounting 
standards.  Specifically, my main analysis is concerned with testing whether cross-border 
contagion is more pronounced among IFRS adopting countries, relative to non-adopters.  
I focus on two interrelated measures commonly used to capture cross-border contagion: 
worst return contagion and the variability of market liquidity.  All tests employ a country-
level pairwise sample and are in the spirit of a difference-in-differences design, exploiting 
variation in the adoption dates of countries.  I include interaction terms to capture the 
average pair-wise correlations in returns and liquidity measures of IFRS adopting 
countries, relative to pair-wise correlation between non-adopting countries.  In addition, 




extreme value probability approach (see Forbes [2012] for an excellent review of 
estimation methods).14   
My identification strategy comprises a number of dimensions.  First, I identify my 
underlying mechanism, i.e. mixing of investor bases, by examining the clustering of 
returns in only the bottom decile of market-level return distributions.  This proxy for 
adverse market shocks ensures that, assuming investors are now more globalized, they will 
have to re-balance and sell off stocks in order to cover their loses – mechanically 
transmitting the adverse shock to other markets in which they hold positions.  
Additionally, I also attempt to measure the extent of IFRS-induced foreign investment 
within local markets through my cross-sectional analysis (see section 3.3).  Second, all 
analysis is performed using filtered returns in order to ensure my incidences of clustering 
and co-movement amongst pairs of countries are not simply due to common exposure to 
global factors, i.e. I attempt to isolate the idiosyncratic country-level return.  Third, I look 
at clustering and co-movement of current local market conditions to lagged foreign 
market conditions.  This provides comfort that local markets were impacted by shocks 
originating in foreign markets and avoids the potential simultaneity concern with looking 
at contemporaneous correlations.  Finally, in order to isolate whether accounting 
harmonization exacerbates observed cross-border contagion I exploit variation in country-
level adoption dates (and non-adopters) via my inclusion of an interaction that estimates 
                                                          
14 Forbes (2012: 10) notes that “extreme-value analysis is emerging as potentially the cleanest approach 
to measuring the most common definition of contagion—any transmission of extreme negative 




the incremental effect when both local and foreign markets follow IFRS.  I explain my 
research design in greater detail below.   
 
3.1 Cross-border worst return contagion 
Bekaert et al. [2005], among others, define contagion as the correlation in returns 
above and beyond economic fundamentals such as exposure to common global risk 
factors.  It is this notion that I intend to capture in the current study.  To control for the 
potential effects of common exposure to fundamentals in driving my contagion 
correlation, I filter my constructed country index returns for common exposures.  
Effectively, the filtering process defines deviations from the expected correlation in 
returns based on economic fundamentals. Consistent with prior research, I regress the 
returns of each country, j, individually, on a number of variables, using the following 
specification: 
                                                                                  (1) 
    Where, 
         = Price of crude oil (Brent) at the end of week t; 
        = Change in price of crude oil (Brent) in week t; 
       = Weekly return on the MSCI world index portfolio (including US); 
          = Weekly volatility in the MSCI world index, measured as the standard 
deviation of daily returns during week t; 
 
        = Weekly change in 3-month LIBOR for week t; and 
 





I define the residual from the above regression as the return for country j over 
week t, over and above common exposures.  Accordingly, any observed clustering in the 
filtered return should represent contagion – i.e. contagion above correlation expected by 
fundamentals.  The decision to use a weekly return window for this study was a trade-off 
between: (1) having a long enough window to mitigate measurement issues relating to the 
thinness of trading in some of the smaller international firms; (2) a fine enough window 
to capture investor trading in response to foreign shocks.  Based on this, daily posed 
significant measurement issues and monthly windows appeared too noisy.   
I include the weekly MSCI return index inclusive of the U.S. in the filtering 
process given the propensity for international markets to move with the U.S.  For 
instance, Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou [2013] show that lagged U.S. returns predict returns 
for a number of foreign markets, especially non-industrial economies.15      
To capture cross-border contagion in returns, I utilize an extreme value approach 
that tests whether left tail observations in filtered return distributions are correlated 
across countries (see Forbes [2012]).  Consistent with prior literature, I define left tail 
observations as filtered returns in the bottom decile of a country’s time-series distribution 
over the entire sample period—known as “worst returns”.  I use a logit model to address 
the issue of contagion by estimating whether a given country is more likely to have a 
worst return during a given week, conditional on other countries having also experienced 
                                                          




a worst return in the previous week.16  The dependent variable (Loc_Worst_Ret) is an 
indicator variable set to one if the local country index, D, under study has a (filtered) 
weekly return in the bottom decile of all weekly returns for that country and zero 
otherwise. To measure the extent of clustering in worst returns, I include a variable 
For_Worst_Ret which is an indicator variable set to one if the matched foreign country, f, 
is experiencing a worst return in the prior week, t-1. To capture the role of accounting 
harmonization in worst-return contagion, I include an indicator variable, Both_IFRS, that 
is set to one if both the domestic and matched foreign country follow IFRS, and the 
interaction between them.  Importantly, I control for changes in bilateral trade between 
the domestic and foreign country (Export), measured as the percentage change in exports 
of domestic country to the foreign match.  This is a necessary control as Chen and Zhang 
[1997] find that cross-market correlations of stock returns are related to external trade 
among countries.  In order to control for country-level differences in capital market 
enforcement which may be related to cross-border investment patterns, I include a 
country-level enforcement variable (Enf) from Leuz [2010].  Country-pair, and year, fixed 
effects (FE) are included to capture any unobserved country-pair economic relations or 
macro level shocks.  Given each observation of the dependent variable is matched to 
multiple realizations of the independent variable i.e., each weekly local-market 
observation is matched to all other foreign market observations for a given week, I use 
robust standard errors clustered at the country-week level.  This allows for correlation 
                                                          
16 Logit models have been used extensively in the contagion literature (see, for instance, Eichengreen 




within standard errors of all country-pairs for a given local market in a given week, a 
much larger dimension than simply within country-pairs.  This leads to the following 
specification    
Leading to the following specification: 
                                                                                      
                                                                                                               (2) 
I expect to observe     , indicating significant clustering in worst-returns among 
countries that follow IFRS, relative to the clustering among those that do not.  I don’t 
have a clear prediction on    given it is conditional on the matched foreign country also 
following IFRS, thus one cannot simply interpret this as the impact of IFRS adoption on 
the likelihood of a local market experiencing a worst return.  In addition, I expect the 
coefficient on    to be positive and significant, given prior literature in finance has 
established the existence of contagion in returns across markets.  However, as the focus of 
this study is on the incremental impact of IFRS adoption on contagion, the interaction 
term is of most importance in confirming my predictions.                    
To make inferences regarding the nature of the documented cross-border 
contagion I re-estimate the above replacing worst return measure with an analogous “best 
return” measure, simply defined as weekly return in the top decile of a given country’s 
weekly return distribution and compare the evidence of clustering in worst returns to that 
observed in best returns.  Consistent with my arguments and characterization of 
contagion, I expect clustering among extreme negative returns to outweigh that observed 




contagion and not simply interdependence amongst markets that is present across the 
entire distribution of returns; a common concern in the contagion literature (see 
Claessens and Forbes [2003]).    
 
3.2  Liquidity contagion 
This sub-section describes my research design with respect to capturing liquidity 
contagion.  As a first step, I need to establish that local market liquidity responds to 
changes in foreign market liquidity.  This is necessary because my later tests capture the 
relation between the variability of market liquidity, so it is important to establish the sign 
of the co-movement that underpins this variability—a positive relation would be 
consistent with my interpretation of liquidity contagion as risk for local capital markets.  
To do so, I estimate the following model (3) to examine the association between local 
market liquidity and foreign market liquidity for IFRS and non-IFRS jurisdictions:  
                                                                                 (3) 
where, the prefix “  ” denotes the percentage change in the variables, defined as 
follows: 
       = Average of        across all firms in market m for week t, where      is 
defined as the average daily price impact (DPI) for firm i in week t. 
(DPI is defined in detail below);    





               = Indicator set to 1 if firm i corresponding foreign market f report 
under IFRS, else set to 0. 
I expect     , indicating that the weekly percentage change in local market level 
liquidity is positively associated with weekly percentage changes in foreign market level 
liquidity, when both countries have adopted IFRS.  In addition, I expect that     , in 
line with analytical results from Brunnermeier and Pederson [2009].  While I have no 
formal prediction on the coefficient,   , an insignificant finding would strengthen my 
evidence indicating no relation between domestic market liquidity and foreign market 
changes in liquidity when these countries follow different standards.            
After establishing a positive relation between local and foreign market liquidity 
changes, I turn to the measurement of the spread of liquidity shocks.  Consistent with 
prior research, I use liquidity volatility (Liqvol) to capture the extent to which a market has 
experienced a shock to liquidity.17  My choice of liquidity volatility, rather than the level 
of liquidity, as the variable of interest is based on the following reasoning.  First, given the 
objective of this study is to show that IFRS imposes unintended costs on capital markets, 
there is a growing consensus that investors price the variability of liquidity, rather than 
the level.18  For instance Persaud [2003] notes, “there is a broad belief among users of 
financial liquidity-- traders, investors and central bankers—that the principal challenge is 
not the average level of financial liquidity, but its variability and uncertainty”.  Moreover, 
                                                          
17 An empirical by-product of an extreme illiquidity event is an increase in the variability of the 
illiquidity variable over the period.     
18 The premise of this argument is that investors prefer firms with relatively predictable liquidity 
because it allows them to more accurately anticipate the trading costs with closing out a position, at 
the time of initial purchase.  To the extent a stock‘s liquidity is highly variable, it increases the 




Lou and Sadka [2010] show that during a crisis period, liquidity variability is more 
appropriate for predicting stock return performance than is the level of liquidity. 
Liquidity volatility is measured as the natural log of weekly standard deviation of 
the daily Amihud’s [2002] price impact of trade measure (DPI).  The DPI measure 
captures the ability of investors to trade in a stock without affecting its price.  One can 
think of it as an estimate of the potential price impact associated with transacting one 
thousand dollars worth of stock in a given day.  Following prior literature, I calculate DPI 
as: 
   
|   |
        
 
 where,      is the daily percentage price change,     is the price in $U.S., and       
is the trading volume in thousands, for stock i on day d.  Higher values of DPI indicate 
greater illiquidity, i.e. greater price impact from trading.  I exclude zero return days from 
the calculation to avoid misclassifying days with no trading activity (Daske et al. [2008]), 
and require a minimum of 3 daily DPI observations for a valid firm-week Liqvol.  This 
measure captures extreme changes to weekly liquidity, therefore examining the 
correlation between domestic Liqvol and lagged foreign market Liqvol will provide insight 
into the transmission of liquidity shocks across national borders.   
To formally test my predictions, I employ a difference-in-differences type design, 
exploiting the variation in country level adoption dates, and pair-wise matches, by 
augmenting traditional liquidity volatility determinant models used in the literature (e.g. 




(For_Mkt_LiqVol), an indicator capturing whether both the domestic and matched foreign 
market follow IFRS (Both_IFRS) and the interaction between them.  I also include 
country-pair and year fixed effects (FE), as follows:  
                                                                              (4) 
                                                                                                            
 
Where, domestic market liquidity volatility (Dom_Mkt_Liq) is computed as the 
equal weighted weekly average of all firms’ Liqvol within in a given country.  This country-
level liquidity volatility is then matched to lagged foreign market liquidity volatility of all 
other foreign markets.  As an example, German market liquidity volatility over week t is 
matched to liquidity volatility for all other 34 countries over week t-1.  This yields a 
sample of domestic-market-to-foreign-market weekly pairs which constitutes the unit of 
observation for my analysis.  I also include country pair fixed effects to control for any 
unobservable bilateral economic relations between countries.  All other control variables 
are defined as above.   
This design allows me to examine whether variability in local market liquidity is 
explained by liquidity shocks originating in foreign markets.  More importantly, I test for 
a differential effect between IFRS adopting country pairs and non-IFRS adopting country 
pairs in order to isolate the role of accounting harmonization in the transmission of 
liquidity shocks. Note that I control for the level of domestic market returns (Ret) and 




annual level of exports (in $U.S.) from domestic market  m to foreign market f.19  I expect 
the coefficient on the interaction term   , to be significantly positive, indicating that 
domestic liquidity volatility is exacerbated by shocks to foreign market liquidity volatility 
when both countries follow IFRS.  
 
3.3 Cross-sectional analysis: Integration effect 
I then turn my attention to cross-sectional analysis among IFRS-adopters.  In 
order to provide comfort that my observed clustering in worst returns, and increased 
correlation of liquidity volatility, among IFRS adopting markets is attributable to an IFRS 
integration effect, I partition the sample based on the changes in foreign portfolio equity 
investment (FPI) immediately following the adoption of IFRS.  The rationale being that if 
increased foreign investment promoted by IFRS adoption is the catalyst for increased 
foreign liquidity shocks as I argue, we should see countries with the most IFRS-induced 
foreign investment are most susceptible to liquidity shocks.  
Empirically, I measure market integration as the change in FPI around the time of 
IFRS adoption. To do so, I obtain annual country level data (in $USD) from 2001 
through 2010 on the foreign portfolio holdings of 73 countries from the Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).20  The 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) is an annual voluntary portfolio 
                                                          
19 Bilateral trade data is sourced from the U.N. data statistics website.which  can be found at 
(http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQuery.aspx). 
20 The CPIS reports bilateral data on foreign equity portfolio asset holdings by the residence of the 
issuer. For each of the 73 source countries, the survey reports holdings in approximately 240 
destination countries or territories. 




investment data collection exercise conducted under the auspices of the IMF.  To 
participate, an economy must provide data on its year-end holdings of securities (data are 
separately requested for equity, long-term debt instruments, and short-term debt 
instruments). All economies are encouraged to participate.  I compute the yearly 
percentage change in FPI inflows for a country, excluding investment by the US, scaled by 
opening total equity market equity capitalization.  I partition countries into High and 
Low sub-samples, splitting at the median change in FPI immediately following the 
adoption of IFRS.  I then re-estimate equations (2) and (4) within high and low sub-
samples, expecting that those countries with greatest inflow of FPI post IFRS, should have 
greatest risk of cross-border contagion.      
 
3.4 Cross-sectional analysis: Transparency effect 
Working against the potential increase in contagion from this integration effect, IFRS 
may be viewed as more than a simple homogenous tool of integration.  Prior literature 
has shown IFRS to be more transparent than prior GAAP.  Given increased transparency 
may shield firms from local liquidity shocks (e.g. Lang and Maffett [2011]; Brunnermeier 
and Pederson [2009]), I empirically test whether transparency can attenuate this new 
foreign source of risk.  I measure the change in reporting quality as a result of IFRS 
adoption in two ways.  First, drawing on arguments in the prior literature that find 
countries with the largest differences between local GAAP and IFRS tend to exhibit the 
greatest increase in accounting quality, I employ a measure of “Accounting distance” 




GAAP differed from IFRS along the dimensions of 21 key accounting standards (see Yu 
[2011] for in-depth discussion on the accounting distance variable).  Differences are 
constructed based on a survey of seven global accounting firms (Nobes [2008]) who 
presented a detailed comparison of different accounting rules in each country and 
classifies them to be the same or different from IFRS.  Greater accounting distance 
therefore signifies a greater increase in reporting quality attributable to the IFRS 
mandate.   
My second measure of IFRS reporting quality is more direct, and adapted from 
Leuz et al. [2003].  It is an aggregate measure of accounting quality that captures the 
variability of accruals, the ability of accruals to map into cash flows, and the incidence of 
small losses.  These measures are first computed at the firm level, then, to convert these 
measures to a single country metric, I take the median value of each measure across all 
firms within a country, and take the average rank of these values across all four measures 
for each country.  I compute these measures using post-IFRS accounting numbers, and 
then compare my computed values to the country-level values reported in Leuz et al. 
[2003], i.e., pre-IFRS country-level values.  I then take the difference in these two values as 
my country-level measure of “IFRS reporting quality”. 
Using both measures of post-IFRS accounting quality, I partition the sample based 
into high and low countries and then re-estimate equations (2) and (4).  Note that, in 
these regressions, I also include a specification where I control for IFRS-induced FPI 




expect the strength of the return and liquidity contagion relation to be attenuated for 








This study utilizes data from a number of sources.  First, I collect firm-level market 
data for all available countries from Datastream, including all 17 Eurozone countries, 
from 2000 through 2010. 21  Specifically, I obtain daily returns, daily prices, weekly 
market value of equity, annual financial statement data including reporting GAAP, and 
relevant firm-specific information such as SEDOL, firm name and description, industry, 
major exchange listing, country of listing/incorporation, equity status, equity type, listing 
currency and reporting currency from Datastream.  I obtain daily volume, daily exchange 
rates and annual fiscal period end dates Bloomberg.  As a supplementary source for daily 
volume data, I use Datastream when Bloomberg daily volume is missing.  Data on 
bilateral Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) is sourced from the IMF data website, and 
bilateral trade data on exports from the UN data statistics website.  Data on ADR 
programs is obtained from the Bank of New York, and data on country specific DR 
                                                          
21 Eurozone, officially known as the “Euro area”, is an economic and monetary alliance between 17 
European Union member states. These countries include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 




programs is obtained as part of my country level non-common equity filters from 
Datastream.  
Beginning with a full Datastream sample of 36,492 securities located across 48 
markets, I remove securities without valid SEDOLs, duplicates, non-equity issuances, 
exchange traded funds and funds, investment vehicles, real estate funds, preference share, 
warrants and debt issuances, along with the identifiable non-primary listings, with the 
goal to preserve a sample of traded common equity stocks.22  Table 1, Panel A details 
these procedures, which results in 29,727 (or 16,804,038 firm-weeks) securities with 
return data relevant to our sample period, 2001-2010. 
Given the importance of return and liquidity measures, I run return filters as per 
Griffin et al. [2008] in order to mitigate the potential for data errors.23  Following, 5,574 
firms (6,877,697 firm-weeks) are removed due to insufficient data with respect to my 
contagion measures.  Further, I remove 3,984 firms (3,386,352 firm-weeks) with missing 
data on the specific accounting standards followed; 1,469 firms (726,828 firm-weeks) due 
to missing data regarding control variables and ADR/GDR firms; 4,008 firms (2,441,788 
firm-weeks) due to insufficient time-series of data pre- and post-IFRS adoption; and 1,880 
firms (678,443 firm-weeks) with opening market capitalization less than $50M USD.  
This leaves a final sample of 2,692,930 firm-week observations (13,494 firms), over the 
                                                          
22 In order to ensure I keep valid common equity stocks, I run name filters as per Griffin et al. [2009].  
Given Datastream details security information within a firm’s name, such as delisting date, share 
status/type etc., I perform automated and manual checking procedures to ensure only valid omissions.  
23 For daily returns, if rt or rt-1 > 100 percent and (1+ r t-1)*(1+ rt)-1<20 percent, then both rt and rt-1 are 
set equal to a missing value.  Additionally, any daily return greater than 200 percent is set to missing.  
For weekly returns, if rt or rt-1 > 300 percent and (1+ rt-1)*(1+ rt)-1 < 50 percent, then both rt and rt-1 are 




period 2001-2010 consisting of local stocks traded by local investors, across 35 countries. 
Table 1, Panel B outlines the above procedures.  I then compute my country-level return 
indexes and liquidity volatility measure as the equal weighted average of all firms within a 
given country.  It is important to note that my country-level returns are computed using 
only locally traded equities, in order to reduce the confounding effect of cross-listed firms 
on my results.  Each country-week is then matched to all other country-weeks (with a lag), 
for a given week.  This yields a final pairwise sample of 559,936 country-week 
observations and forms the sample utilized for my difference-in-difference analysis.        
One of the primary variables of interest in this study is the date at which a firm 
(and country) adopted IFRS.  This data is collected from two primary sources.  First, for 
country-level adoption dates, data is gathered from Deloitte’s IASPlus website, which has 
been used extensively in prior literature and is a source of information for the IASB.  Of 
the 174 jurisdictions with available information on IASPlus, 93 require the use of IFRS 
for all listed companies, with another 25 permitting its use, as of January 2012.  In the 
few instances where countries have staggered adoption timelines I use the earliest date at 
which a significant number of firms were required to use IFRS, otherwise I use the 
earliest fiscal-year end date following IFRS adoption.24  Many jurisdictions that maintain 
their own local GAAP claim that their local GAAP is "based on" or "similar to" or 
"converged with" IFRSs.  Often, not all IASs/IFRSs have been adopted locally—there is a 
                                                          
24 For instance, Chile adopted IFRS over three years. Major open corporations, i.e. greater than 500 
shareholders were required to prepare IFRS-compliant financial statements from 1 January 2009 (31 
December 2009 year-ends), while small open corporations, i.e. less than 500 shareholders didn’t have 




time lag in adopting an IFRS is local GAAP.  Note that IASPlus do not compare national 
or regional GAAPs to IFRSs in detail; they report only direct use of IFRSs in individual 
countries or regions.  Direct use means that the basis of preparation note and the 
auditor's report will refer to conformity with IFRSs.  For additional information, I also 
use adoptIFRS.org, which outlines key dates of countries’ IFRS adoption procedures.  In 
order to ensure I’m capturing the appropriate date of convergence for my constructed 
country indexes, I also hand collect data on individual firm adoption dates and ensure 
country-level dates line up with at least 70 percent of firms in each country.    
Data on the IFRS adoption dates of individual firms are collected from 
Worldscope.  I begin with information from the “Accounting Standards Followed” field 
in Worldscope as it offers the largest sample.  I identify IFRS-firm years if Worldscope 
indicates that financials are based on “International Standards”, “IFRS”, or “IASC”.  I 
then verify, manually, the coding of a random sample of IFRS adopting firm year 
observations, where possible.  Towards this end, I download electronic copies of annual 
reports from Thomson Research, and company websites (where identifiable), search and 
read the relevant parts of the annual report (footnote and/or auditors report).  In total, I 
verified approximately 1,200 IFRS-year adoptions from 24 IFRS-adopting countries. 
Table 2 presents the breakdown of sample coverage within each country.  Overall, 
my sample covers 74 percent of total market capitalization over the period.  It is noted 
that while a large number of countries adopted IFRS from fiscal period ending 31 




dates (and non-adoption) among my sample of countries (see Table 2 for country level 
adoption dates).    
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for 
all variables for the full sample of 559,936 unique country-weeks.  Panel B shows the 
mean values of my liquidity measures on a country-by-country basis.  The average weekly 
liquidity volatility is 0.488 with average weekly return of 0.017.  From Panel B, we see 
that there exists significant variation in liquidity volatility across countries, with Indonesia 
having the largest liquidity volatility of 1.132.  It is also notable that liquidity volatility is, 
on average, larger for IFRS adopting jurisdictions, following the adoption of IFRS.    
  In cross-sectional tests I employ measures of cross-border equity investment by 
using the Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) data maintained by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  The data is found on the Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS) website.25   The data is reported in millions of U.S. dollars.  The CPIS data 
shows bilateral trade flow data, in matrix form, from the individual economy tables of 
residents' holdings of securities issued by nonresidents (reported data) and the derived 
data for nonresidents' holdings of securities issued by residents (derived data). The 
geographic breakdown of the reported data is limited to the CPIS participating 
economies, while the geographic breakdown of the derived data covers all economies that 
issue securities that are held by CPIS participating economies. The data used in this study 
                                                          




is based on information provided by economies that participated in the 2010 and 2011 








5.1 Discussion of main results 
Table 4 shows the results from my worst return contagion analysis.  Consistent 
with my first prediction, I find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction 
term,   = 0.402 (p<0.01).  This suggest that IFRS adopting jurisdictions exhibit an 
average of 45 percent more clustering of worst returns, relative to non-adopting countries, 
indicating that IFRS adopting countries are now significantly more likely to experience 
negative price movements due to cross-border contagion.  Moreover, the clustering is 
much weaker – almost four times smaller – in upside returns (i.e. returns in the top 10% 
of their return distributions).  This asymmetry in the observed clustering of different tail 
returns suggests that my results are not simply documenting increased interdependence, 
i.e. co-movement in any state of the world.  With respect to my control variables, Export is 
significantly positive,, consistent with expectations, while Enf is negative but only 
marginally significant. 
I perform the following sensitivity testing to ensure the robustness of my result: 
(1) I repeat this analysis choosing different extreme value thresholds for which to 
examine the probability of clustering—instead of the 10th percentile, I re-define 




20th percentile (un-tabulated).  As expected, I find that the observed clustering 
is more pronounced (  = 0.523, p<0.05) when using more extreme realizations 
(5th percentile), and significantly attenuated (  = 0.212, p<0.01) when using 
less extreme realizations (20th percentile).  This provides further comfort that 
my main result is evidence of downside contagion, and not simply 
interdependence or common exposure to fundamentals.   
(2) I repeat the main analysis by assigning worst return weeks on a yearly basis, this 
ensures that worst return observations are not clustered in post-IFRS period 
given the recent financial crisis of 2008/2009.  Effectively, I enforce the same 
number of worst return observations to occur each year, to ensure power in 
both the pre- and post-IFRS period.  I note that results are attenuated in 
magnitude (  = 0.328, p<0.05) but not significantly different from those 
reported.      
(3) I also perform the analysis at the firm level, where an additional control was 
added for whether the domestic market return was a worst return.  The tenor 
of the results remains the same, in that I find evidence consistent with return 
contagion impacting individual firms, above and beyond local market wide 
movements (  = 0.383, p<0.01).  While the focus of the paper is at the market 
level, the firm level results provide further comfort given the increased 
variation in adoption dates, and additional variation able to be exploited as 





With respect to my liquidity contagion analysis, I first establish that domestic 
market liquidity movements are related to foreign market-level liquidity changes, and that 
these changes are more pronounced amongst IFRS adopting jurisdictions.  Table 5 
presents the results of estimating equation (3).  I find a positive and significant coefficient 
on the interaction term,                  , indicating an incrementally positive 
association between weekly percentage change in firm level liquidity and weekly 
percentage change in a foreign market level liquidity when both countries have adopted 
IFRS.  While the coefficient on the main effect is still positive and significant,          
        , the relation between domestic market-level liquidity and foreign market 
changes in liquidity is significantly smaller unless both countries follow IFRS.  This 
establishes a positive co-movement between local and domestic liquidity.  In addition, the 
strength of this co-movement is almost double when both firms and markets report under 
IFRS.  Prima-facie, these findings suggests accounting harmonization may play a role in 
the transmission of cross-border liquidity shocks, and that the co-movement in liquidity 
represents exposure to additional foreign risk.    
I now turn my attention to a more in-depth analysis, employing control variables 
and my measures of liquidity shock transmission.  When markets experience a liquidity 
shock it necessarily increases the variability of market level liquidity.  To the extent that 
accounting harmonization exacerbates the propagation of liquidity shocks, we should see 
liquidity variability more correlated amongst IFRS adopting countries, relative to non-
adopting countries.  Table 6 presents the regression results for the domestic market and 




prior literature, control variables load significant with the predicted sign.  In terms of my 
variables of interest, local liquidity volatility tends to increase in the week following an 
increase in foreign market volatility.  However, this contagious effect is almost doubled 
amongst IFRS adopting jurisdictions (                .  This suggests that liquidity 
volatility of local markets is much more impacted by foreign shocks occurring in foreign 
markets (captured via lagged foreign market liquidity volatility) when both markets follow 
IFRS.  I take this as evidence of liquidity contagion amongst IFRS adopting markets.27   
As further robustness, I also estimate the relation between local market liquidity 
volatility and foreign market liquidity by including all matched foreign markets as 
separate regressors and fully interacting them with IFRS variable.  This effectively removes 
the issue of repeated independent variables.  In addition, it allows insight into the 
importance of each foreign market on the impact of local liquidity volatility.  In un-
tabulated results I find that more than half IFRS adopting countries (14) were positive 
and significant, suggesting that my contagion results is pervasive in my sample and not 
driven by a few large countries.         
Overall, the evidence suggests that foreign liquidity shocks—captured by the extent 
of variability in foreign market liquidity—appear to impact domestic market liquidity 
                                                          
27 It is noted that the main effect on the pairwise IFRS indicator is negative and significant (   
              , broadly consistent with prior literature that suggests reporting transparency (IFRS 
has been argued to proxy for this) can reduce liquidity variability (e.g., Lang and Maffett [2011], 
Vayanos [2004]).  However, I caution the reader from drawing any inferences from this particular 
coefficient, given the indicator variable, IFRS, is conditional on whether the matched foreign market is 
also following IFRS, it is not simply capturing the average impact of IFRS reporting on market 




volatility.  This impact almost twice as large amongst IFRS adopters, suggesting that 
accounting harmonization exacerbated the spread of contagion.   
 
5.2 Discussion of alternative explanations 
An alternative explanation for the above contagion results may be that IFRS 
adopters are just inherently more integrated in the first place, especially given that a large 
number of adopters are “Euro Area” countries that share a number of trade agreements 
and exposure to common to foreign exchange risks.  However, given my design, the 
argument would have to be that these countries become more economically integrated 
around the time of IFRS adoption.  A number of prior studies however show that the 
main push for economic integration within the E.U. happened around the time of the 
introduction of the Euro, in January 1999, and the formation of the “Euro Area” which 
ratified a number of economic and trade link agreements.  For instance, Jayaraman and 
Verdi [2012] documented convergence in firms’ fundamentals subsequent to the 
introduction of the Euro currency in 1999, rather than post IFRS-adoption in 2005.  
While Rajan and Zingales [2003] find that cross-border bond financing spikes 
substantially (i.e., by more than three times) immediately after the adoption of the Euro.  
In light of these findings, one may conclude that the main thrust of Euro linkages and 
integration occurred in the pre-IFRS period, several years before IFRS reporting.  
Notwithstanding, I control for the yearly bilateral exports between my country pairs in my 
market level analysis, in order to abstract away from significant real economic linkages, 




to IFRS.  Moreover, I plot the average growth in exports (proxy for bilateral trade) for 
IFRS adopting and non-IFRS adopting countries from 2001-2010 in Figure 1A.  This 
shows that significant trade growth occurred in the pre-IFRS period  (i.e., pre 2005), and 
moreover we don’t see significant spikes in trade growth among IFRS-adopter relative to 
non-adopting countries.     
Additionally any investment behavior associated with E.U. integration rather than 
accounting harmonization likely happened in my pre-IFRS period.  The move to a single 
currency within the E.U. has effectively removed currency risk among member countries, 
increasing the substitutability of domestic and foreign securities, and likely increasing 
bilateral foreign investment amongst member countries.  Lane and Milesi-Ferrett [2008] 
find the most significant increase in intra-euro area holdings (as a share of world cross-
border holdings occurred in the period 1999-2005, up from 13.5 percent to 17.75 
percent, with the most pronounced increase in 2001.28  Again, this increased investment 
and market integration with in E.U. members states occurred in the pre-IFRS period, and 
hence would actually bias against my result.  It must be that another round of integration 
occurred around the time of IFRS adoption, which I argue is as a result of harmonized 
accounting standards.   
To provide more direct evidence of this I plot the average yearly level of FPI inflows 
(scaled by opening total equity market capitalization) for IFRS adopting and non-IFRS 
                                                          
28 The fraction of the domestic stock market held by non-resident portfolio investors was substantially 
higher in the euro area and the United Kingdom (over 33.3%) than in the United States and Japan 





countries, see Figure 1B.  From this, it is evident that FPI inflows spiked a little around 
2001, for all countries, however we then see a significant spike in FPI inflows for IFRS-
adopting countries around 2005 (i.e., the time of the mandate in the EU) relative to a 
more modest increase in non-IFRS adopting countries.  I provide additional cross-
sectional evidence to this end below, in Section 5.3. 
 
As final robustness I re-perform my return and liquidity contagion analysis after 
removing the five countries identified in Christensen et al. (2012) as having significant 
concurrent changes in enforcement (i.e., Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and the U.K).  This provides comfort that the observed results are pervasive across all 
IFRS adopters, and attributable to the switch in accounting standards, not simply 
improvements in enforcement.  I find that return and liquidity contagion results are 
slightly attenuated (return contagion coefficient,   = 0.354, p<0.05; liquidity contagion 
coefficient,                ), however not significantly different from those reported 
in Table 4 and Table 6; inferences remained unchanged.    
 
5.3. Cross-sectional analysis 
In order to provide comfort that the observed increase in the clustering of worst 
returns and the correlation of liquidity volatility between IFRS adopting markets is 
indicative of the integration effect of harmonization accounting standards, I test for 
plausible cross-sectional variation based on the extent of IFRS-induced foreign 




investment within IFRS adopting countries (Amiram [2012], Bruggemann et al. [2012], 
Covrig et al. [2007], DeFond et al. [2011], Yu [2011]).  Increasing the percentage of 
foreign investors within a firm’s and country’s investor base will necessarily make the 
stock more susceptible to foreign liquidity shocks, via their trading.  Therefore, I predict a 
positive association between IFRS-induced foreign investment and my measures of cross-
border contagion.   
In line with this, I partition my sample of IFRS adopters based on IFRS-induced 
investment— measured as the percentage increase in Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) in 
the two years immediately following country-level IFRS adoption.  I argue that those 
countries that experienced the greatest increase in investment due to IFRS are more 
susceptible to cross-border contagion through foreign investor trading.  Countries are 
classified as either High or Low based on whether they are above or below the sample 
median change in FPI.  Those countries labeled as “high” foreign investment experienced 
FPI increases of 60 percent, on average, while countries labeled as “low” experienced an 
average increase in FPI of 20.4 percent.29  This is in contrast with non-IFRS adopting 
countries experiencing an average increase in FPI of 16.8%, computed over the same 
                                                          
29 Note that all countries saw increases in FPI following IFRS adoption, except New Zealand (decrease 
of 45%). Portugal experienced the largest increase in FPI post-IFRS adoption with an increase of 
145%. Interestingly, we see the countries that struggled the most during the European crises: Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, and Portugal, all in the “high” IFRS-FPI change category. The full classification of 
countries is as follows: “high” FPI countries consist of: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore; and “Low” countries consist of: Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, 




period—prima facie an indication that IFRS adoption is associated with in an increase in 
FPI, consistent with the conclusions of Amiram [2012].   
Table 7 provides results from re-estimating my logit analysis of return contagion 
(Pane A) and the liquidity volatility (Panel B) specifications across the sub-samples of 
High and Low FPI countries.  Consistent with predictions, I find that return and 
liquidity contagion is significantly more pronounced for High FPI countries, relative to 
Low FPI countries.  I find a positive and significant difference in the interaction term 
For_Mkt_Worst*IFRS (For_Mkt_Liqvol*IFRS) between High and Low FPI countries of 
0.402 (0.052).30   
Table 8 and 9 report the results of my analysis of the role of accounting 
transparency on cross-border contagion.  As discussed in section 3, I measure the 
transparency of IFRS in two ways, (1) employing the country-level accounting distance 
measure (“IFRS reporting impact”) in Yu [2011] and an IFRS earnings quality measure 
                                                          
30 In order to assess the differential impact of impact of foreign investment inflows (FPI) and the 
orthogonal component of IFRS adoption on liquidity volatility, I perform the following test.  Instead 
of pairwise design, I perform a simple OLS regression at the country-week level.  Instead of a 
partitioning the sample, I simply include yearly changes in FPI, and an IFRS indicator that switches on 
when the country adopts IFRS.  This will enable us to observe average impact on liquidity variability 
after controlling for FPI, i.e. can speak to whether IFRS adoption is doing something above and 
beyond the simple channel of foreign investors (integration effect), along the lines of the motivation 
behind my cross-sectional tests.  Under this alternative specification I find that the coefficient on the 
IFRS variable is weakly positive and significant (0.11, p<0.10) indicating that liquidity volatility 
increases when a country adopts IFRS, controlling for the increases in foreign investment flows.  
While the coefficient on the FPI is, as expected, strongly positive (0.09, p<0.01), indicating that local 
market liquidity volatility is increasing in foreign portfolio investment inflows.  However, we cannot 
infer too much from these results as this does not directly test the impact of foreign shocks on local 





(“IFRS-earnings quality”) adapted from Leuz et al. [2003].  I partition the sample into 
High and Low countries based on whether they are above or below the median of the 
sample distribution.  Table 8 shows the results from partitioning the sample into High 
and Low IFRS reporting impact.  I find that the increased accounting transparency of 
IFRS, relative to local GAAP, significantly attenuates incidence of worst return 
contagion, even after controlling for %change in FPI.  Specifically, Panel A shows a 
negative and significant difference (-0.306, p<0.05) between the interaction terms of High 
and Low IFRS reporting impact countries.  Results from Panel B, Table 8, reveal that the 
association between domestic and foreign market liquidity volatility is also significantly 
attenuated in the presence of reporting transparency.  I find a negative and significant 
difference between the interaction terms -0.043 (p<0.10).  This provides support for 
arguments that IFRS, through an increase in transparency, may actually reduce the risk of 
cross-border contagion.    
Table 9 presents contagion results when partitioning the sample using my second 
measure of transparency, IFRS-earnings quality measure.  Panel A shows that return 
contagion is attenuated in High earnings quality countries, relative to Low earnings 
quality countries; a negative and significant difference in the interaction terms of -0.389 
(p<0.05).  Panel B shows the results from my liquidity contagion analysis.  Inferences are 
identical with those reported in Table 8; the increase in transparency brought about by 
IFRS significantly reduces the impact of foreign market liquidity shocks on domestic 




foreign market liquidity (i.e.      ) is not significantly different between sub-samples, as 
expected.  Overall, I find the improvement in reporting transparency due to IFRS 
partially attenuates the observed increase in cross-border contagion.31
                                                          
31 In un-tabulated results I perform a 2x2 analysis partitioning the sample into high and low 
accounting transparency and FPI investment, in order to gain more insight into the interaction 
between the countering effects of integration and transparency. I find that the observed impact of 
foreign market liquidity shocks on local markets only manifest in countries where the transparency 
impact is low (i.e. high FPI country and Low IFRS earnings quality).  The integration and transparency 
effect appear to cancel out in countries that experience both high FPI investment post-IFRS and 
greatest increase in reporting quality.  In addition, I find that the transparency effect is strongest in 
low FPI investment countries, i.e. impact of foreign market shocks is mitigated, and in fact negative 
but only mildly significant (coefficient of -0.011, p<0.10).  Whereas in low reporting quality and low 








 This study documents a consequence of accounting harmonization by showing 
that IFRS adoption carries a significant capital market cost.  A large stream of literature 
has established that as markets become more integrated they are more susceptible to 
cross-border contagion risk in the form of localized financial shocks in one market being 
transmitted to other markets, beyond what economic fundamentals would suggest 
(Pritsker [2001]).  Given a number of studies have documented significant increases in 
cross-border investment flows among IFRS adopting jurisdictions (DeFond et al. [2011], 
Florou and Pope [2012], Yu [2011]), I extend these findings to argue and show that this 
increased market integration of IFRS comes with the consequence of increased cross-
border contagion, i.e. excess co-movement in downside returns.       
Employing a dataset of approximately 14,000 firms in 35 countries from 2001 
through 2010 I document evidence of cross-border contagion among IFRS adopting 
countries.  Specifically, after controlling for common macro-level exposures and bilateral 
trade linkages, I find significant clustering in the incidence of extreme negative market 




countries without harmonized accounting standards.  Providing insight into the potential 
mechanism underlying the documented return contagion, I find that liquidity shocks 
originating in foreign markets have a significantly greater impact on the variability of local 
market liquidity when both the foreign and local markets follow IFRS.  I show that the 
threat of foreign liquidity shocks is increasing in the extent of FPI immediate following 
the adoption of IFRS.  That is, while prior studies have shown the benefits of IFRS 
adoption in broadening access to foreign capital through comparability, familiarity and 
reductions in information asymmetry, the increased foreign investment opens up 
domestic markets to the threat of cross-border contagion.  This result is robust to a 
number of different specifications and sensitivity tests  
However, given IFRS provides greater transparency that many local GAAPs, this 
feature of harmonization may actually attenuate or mitigate the extent to which we see 
cross-border contagion in adopting markets.  Studies such as Brunnermeier and Pederson 
[2009], Acharya and Pederson [2005], and Vayanos [2003] all argue that reduced 
uncertainty can mitigate the impact of a liquidity shock.  Lang and Maffett [2011] build 
on those arguments and show that accounting transparency can reduce the variability and 
co-variability of liquidity, especially in the presence of liquidity shocks.  Therefore, given 
that IFRS are generally seen as being more transparent than prior local GAAPs (e.g. Barth 
et al. [2008]) it may actually attenuate the documented increase in cross-border contagion 
in countries that experienced the greatest increase in transparency from IFRS.  My 
findings are consistent with these expectations.  Results suggest that amongst IFRS 




and markets with greatest increase in reporting quality post-IFRS.  Overall however the 
increased co-movement stemming from mixing of investor bases (integration effect), 
resulting from the harmonization of accounting standards outweighs the attenuating 
effect of increase transparency; the net impact of IFRS adoption being to exacerbate cross-
border contagion.  This is evidenced by the increase in excess return co-movement and 
the increased impact of foreign market liquidity shocks on domestic market liquidity 





Figure 1A:  Export growth (in USD) for IFRS vs non-IFRS adopting countries  
 
Figure 1B: Foreign Portfolio Investment inflows for IFRS vs non-IFRS adopting countries
 
Figure 1A shows the average yearly growth in exports for IFRS adopting and non-IFRS adopting countries.  
The vertical axis is year-on-year export growth in percentage points, while the horizontal axis is the calendar 
year.  Exports are sourced from the UN Trade data website and measured in USD.  Countries that adopt 
IFRS during my sample period are classified as IFRS adopting countries.  
Figure 1B shows the average foreign portfolio equity investment (FPI) inflows (scaled by beginning of year 
total market value) for IFRS and non-IFRS adopting countries.  The vertical axis is FPI scaled by beginning 






















































 Sample selection process 
 
This table shows the sample selection process to arrive at the final sample.  Panel A describes the process by 
which I obtain and screen Datastream firms.  I begin by obtaining a full listing of all Datastream firms with valid 
DSCODES as of February 2011, and then administer a number of filters in order to ensure I only keep common 
equity securities traded on their local exchanges with valid weekly (return and market value) data for our sample 
period, 2001-2010.  Panel B then describes the matching of these firms (and their weekly data) to a dataset of 
GAAP reporting information, to ensure I have correctly identified adopters and non-adopters.  I begin with all 
firms for which Datstream reports "GAAP followed", and then manually check a random sample to actual 
annual reports.  I also obtain the official country-level date given for IFRS adoption from IASplus.com; IASB 
2010, and Deloitte IFRS update (2010).  In additional Panel B reports the number of weekly observations lost to 
missing data.  Panel C then shows the aggregated number of observations at the country-week level, and the 
final pairwise sample of country weeks. 
      
Panel A: Initial firm selection from Datastream     # Firms 
 
All securities with valid DSCODES as of Feb 2011 (sourced: 49 
constituency lists) 
  
                  
41,010  
Less: Securities without valid identifiers 
  
                  
(1,580) 
     Less: Non-equity instruments (i.e. type not equal to "EQ"), non-common 
shares, and duplicates 
 
                
(1,189) 
Less: 
Exchange traded funds / real estate funds / currency funds/ Investment 
vehicles 
 
                  
(1,716) 
Less: Non-primary listings (Primary indicator = "No")  
  
                        
(55) 
Less: Firms without return data for the sample period (2000-2010) 
  
                  
(5,476) 
Less: Delisted/dead firms without valid delisting/dead dates  
  
                  
(1,029) 
Less: Country-level hand checks (Griffin et al., 2008 filters) 
  
                      
(238) 
 
Total DataStream firms with return data 
  
                  
29,727  
     Panel B: Final sample selection (firm-weeks)       # firm-weeks  # Firms 
 
Firm-week return dataset 
 
         16,804,038  
                  
29,727  
Less: firm-weeks with missing/unavailable data for contagion measures 
 
       (6,877,697) 
                  
(5,574) 
Less: firm-years with no GAAP information 
 
           
(3,386,352) 
                  
(3,948) 
Less: Firm-weeks with missing accounting data and ADRs  
 
           (726,828) 
                  
(1,469) 
Less: Firms without at least 24 months of data pre- and post-IFRS  
 
           
(2,441,788) 
                  
(3,362) 
Less: 
Firm-weeks where less than $50M USD in opening market 
capitalization  
 
           (678,443) 
                      
(1,880) 
 
Final sample of firms used to compute country level indexes 
 
2,692,930  
                  
13,494  




TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Final sample selection (Country level) # Ctry-weeks # Country 
 
 
Final sample of country level indexes (Average # firms)  17,498 385 
 Matched (pair-wise) sample country-weeks   559,936 35 






Country coverage and IFRS adoption dates 
This table presents the distribution of firms by country for my sample over the period 2001-2010.  The 
average coverage ratio for a country is equal to the total market capitalization of my firm sample in that 
country (denominated in U.S. dollars), measured at the end of each year, divided by the total market 
capitalization for that country (as reported by the World Bank), and then averaged across years.  World Bank 
market capitalization includes only listed domestic companies at the end of the year, exclusive of investment 
companies, mutual funds, and other collective investment vehicles.  I also report the fiscal period of 
mandatory IFRS adoption for each country.  In most instances these dates represent the first fiscal period end 
where IFRS reporting is required.  I obtain information on IFRS adoption dates from IASPlus website 
maintained by Deloitte, and from press releases from the IASB. Note that in the instance of Australia the first 
fiscal year-end under IFRS is 31-Dec-2005, however given 85% of firms have a June year-end, the more 
appropriate country-level mandatory adoption date is 30-June-2006.     
 
Country 





IFRS Adoption date:                        
Fiscal period end 
1999-2010      2001-2010 
Argentina 27% 
 
          65  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Australia 71% 
 




















        743  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Chile1 63% 
 





        583  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Denmark 59% 
 




















        344  
 
31-Dec-05 
Hong Kong 60% 
 





        685  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Indonesia 75% 
 
        327  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Ireland 78% 
 















        964  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Malaysia 79% 
 
        488  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Mexico 37% 
 
          84  
 
IFRS not mandatory 
Netherlands 52% 
 
        134  
 
31-Dec-05 
New Zealand 67% 
 




















































































      
Total (yearly) 71% 
 
    13,494  
           
 
1: Chile had a staggered IFRS adoption.  Major listed open corporations (i.e. > 500 shareholders) were required to 
prepare IFRS statements for financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009, with smaller listed open 
corporations (i.e. <500 shareholders) to adopt IFRS from 1 January 2010.  All other entities were then permitted, 
but not required, to prepare IFRS financial statements from 1 January 2011. 
2: It is noted that China has not officially adopted IFRS, be it mandatory or voluntary.  However they have 
undertaken substantial convergence with their newly issued national standards (ASBEs) that are mandatory for all 
listed companies from 1 January 2007.  Notwithstanding, enough differences exist (e.g. impairment of assets, 
related party disclosure provisions and certain fair value provisions) that I have classified China as a non-adopter, 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Christensen et al. [2012]).  Given recent statements by the Chinese 
government, it seems unlikely that they will mandate full adoption of IFRS any time in the near future.   
3: While Japan has not yet mandated the use of IFRS, they have allowed mandatory adoption for consolidated 
reports of listed entities for fiscal periods ending 31 March 2010.  An expanded random sample of several 
companies revealed that only a small number of firms had chosen to voluntarily adopt , therefore Japan is 
classified as a non-adopter for the purposes of this study.  Sensitivity testing is undertaken to ensure this 
classification does not significantly impact the main results, given the large number of Japanese observations. 
4: Note that Singapore has not officially adopted IFRS as issued by the IASB, however closely models its 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) according to the IFRS.  Before a standard is enacted, consultations with the 
IASB are made to ensure consistency of core principles.  Therefore, consistent with Christensen et al. [2012] I 







This table shows the descriptive statistics of variables across the full sample of 17,498 country-weeks from 2001-
2010, along with country-level means of the liquidity volatility and returns. Variables are defined as follows: 
RET is the country level weekly return (equal weighted) of locally traded, non-MNC, common equity firms; 
LIQVOL is the average weekly volatility of the Amihud (2002) daily price impact measure (DPI) for all firms in 
a given country, where DPI = |Rid| / (Pid*VOLid), higher values of DPI indicate greater illiquidity, i.e. price 
impact of trades was higher; SIZE is the natural log of market value measured at the beginning of the calendar 
week of firm i in week t, averaged over all firms within a given country; STDRET is the weekly standard 
deviation of the daily returns for a given country in week t; ILLIQ is the average of the aggregated DPI measure 
for a given country in week t; LOSS is the proportion of years that the firm i experienced a loss in the last three 
fiscal year, averaged at the country level; IFRS is an indicator variable set to one if the country is following IFRS 
reporting in a given week, and zero otherwise.      
 
Panel A: Full sample N   Mean Std  Median 
Ret          17,498 
 
0.017 0.158 0.005 
      
LiqVol         17,498 
 
0.488 2.126 0.014 
      
Size         17,498 
 
12.955 1.318 12.065 
StdRet         17,498  
 
0.026 0.015 0.023 
Illiq         17,498 
 
0.397 1.342 0.021 
Loss         17,498 
 
0.149 0.284 0.000 
IFRS (proportion of weeks)         17,498 
 
0.364 0.420 0.000 
      
 
      
      
      



































Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: By Country  
N (firm-
weeks)   
   Ret (%)      LiqVol 
Mean   Mean 

























































































































































































  TABLE 4 
Return contagion amongst IFRS adopters 
This table shows the results from a parametric test of contagion.  Specifically, I run a logit regression where the dependent 
variable is an indicator variable set to one if the local market index has a return in the bottom 10th percentile (a “worst return”) 
of that market’s entire time series of returns, and zero otherwise.  The key independent variable, For_Mkt_Worst is also an 
indicator variable that is set to one if the matched foreign market index has a “worst return” in the previous week.  Effectively, 
this analyses provides statistical evidence about the conditional probability that local market return is below a given threshold 
when the matched foreign market returns also fall below the same worst case threshold.  I then interact this variable with 
another indicator variable, Both_IFRS, which is set to 1 in weeks where both the domestic and foreign country report under 
IFRS, and zero all other weeks. The interaction term (For Market Worst * Both_IFRS), then captures the incremental impact 
on the relation between domestic and lagged foreign worst returns among IFRS adopting jurisdictions. I also include Exports to 
control for bilateral trade linkages between countries, which captures the change in exports from the domestic country to the 
foreign country; and Enf which controls for the capital market enforcement in the domestic country.  Note that the coefficient 
on the enforcement control could be either positive or negative depending on whether the integration or transparency effect is 
stronger in determining worst returns.  I include country, and year fixed effects, however in the interests of parsimony 
coefficients have been omitted from this table.  I report standard errors in parentheses under the parameter estimates, with 
significance based on two-tailed tests. All continuous non-logarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 





“Worst Returns”          
Pr (Ret < p10) 
“Best Returns”                    
Pr (Ret > p90)  
(For_Mkt_Worst * Both_IFRS) (+) 0.402 *** 0.119 * 





Foreign Market Worst (For_Mkt_Worst) 
  






Both_IFRS ? -0.578 *** 0.468 ** 
  
[0.096]  [0.265]  
Bilateral Exports (Exports) + 0.943 ** 0.894 *** 
  
[0.431]  [0.468] 
 
Enforcement cluster (Enf) -/+ -0.961 * -0.384 
 
  



























        
Odd ratio estimate (Interaction)  1.920   1.172     











  TABLE 5 
Relation between changes in domestic liquidity and changes in foreign market liquidity  
This table shows the results for equation (1) as follows: 
 
                                                                     (1) 
Where the prefix,   denotes the percentage change from t-1 to t of the relevant variables;        is the average of 
       across all firms in local market m for week t, where        is the average daily price impact (DPI) for firm i in 
week t, where DPI is defined as the absolute change in price on a given day divided by the USD dollar volume on that 
day (Amihud [2002]);       is the average DPI across all firms in foreign market f (i.e. all other markets not m) in week 
t; and Both_IFRS is an indicator set to one when both country m, and foreign market f report under IFRS, else set to zero. 
The interaction term                         ), then captures the incremental impact on the relation between changes 
in local market and foreign market liquidity.  Observations are at the country-week-foreign level, i.e. each firm week is 
matched to all other countries in a given week. Given the dependent variable is repeated, I cluster standard errors at the 
country-week level.  I include country-pair and year fixed effects, however these coefficients have been omitted from the 
tabulated results.  I report t-statistics in parentheses under the parameter estimates, with significance based on two-tailed 
tests. Note that liquidity measures enter the regression as natural logs in order to mitigate issues with distributional 







(%chg WPI)    
 
                        ) (+) 0.056 ***  
    
[3.32]   
 
Weekly % change in Foreign market liquidity 
(        ) 
  
(+) 0.062 ***  
  
[5.42]    
 













N        595,498     
Adjusted R-sqr  11.36%    
      











  TABLE 6 
Relation between domestic and foreign-market liquidity volatility (Liquidity Contagion) 
This table shows the relation between local market liquidity volatility and foreign market liquidity volatility, pre- and post-
IFRS, controlling for established determinants.  It reports results for market-level liquidity volatility on lagged foreign 
market-level liquidity volatility. Observations are at the domestic-market-to-foreign-market-weekly level, i.e. each market 
week is matched to all other market-weeks. Given the dependent variable is repeated, I cluster standard errors at the 
market-level. I regress market-week liquidity volatility on lagged For_Mkt_Liqvol, Both_IFRS and the interaction.  These 
variables are defined as follows: Mkt_Liqvol is the natural log of the average weekly volatility (Liqvol) for all firms in 
domestic country, d, for week t, where Liqvol is the weekly volatility of the Amihud (2002) daily price impact measure 
(DPI), where DPI = |Rid| / (Pid*VOLid), higher values of DPI indicate greater illiquidity, i.e. price impact of trades was 
higher, Rid is the percentage change in price for firm i on day d, and VOLid is the total volume (in thousands) for firm i on 
day d, and Pid is the price in USD for firm i on day d; For_Mkt_Liqvol  is Mkt_Liqvol for all countries other than country j, 
i.e. matched foreign countries; IFRS is an indicator variable set to 1 if both the domestic firm and the matched foreign 
market follow IFRS in week t, and zero otherwise.  I also include the following control variables: Exports to control for 
bilateral trade linkages between countries, which captures the natural log of annual change in exports from the domestic 
country to the foreign country over the current calendar year; Illiq to control for the average level of market liquidity, 
measured as the average of the aggregated DPI measure for a given country in week t; Ret is the natural log of the 
domestic country return in week t, note this is constructed as the equal weighted return using my sample of firms for 
a given country; Enf which controls for the capital market enforcement in the domestic country.  The variable of primary 
interest is the interaction term,(For_Mkt_Liqvol * IFRS), this captures the incremental impact on the relation between 
domestic and lagged foreign liquidity volatility among IFRS adopting jurisdictions. I include country, and year fixed 
effects, however in the interests of parsimony coefficients have been omitted from this table.  I report t-statistics in 
parentheses under the parameter estimates, with significance based on two-tailed tests.  All continuous variables are 











(For_Mkt_Liqvol * Both_IFRS) (+)  0.068 **  
    
 [2.19] 
   
Foreign Market Liquidity Volatility (For_Mkt_Liqvol) 
  
(+)  0.523 ** 
   
  [2.35] 
  
















  Enforcement cluster (from Leuz 2010) -/+  -0.081 ** 
    [2.64]   
Fixed effects   Ctry-pair, Yr  
Clustered S.E.  
 
  Country 
  N 
 
 559,936 














    
TABLE 7 
Cross-border Contagion for High Vs Low FPI post IFRS 
This table shows return contagion results (Panel A) and liquidity contagion results (Panel B) for IFRS adopters, 
partitioned into High FPI countries and Low FPI countries.  High (Low) FPI countries are those countries who 
experienced the largest (smallest), i.e. above (below) median, percentage change in FPI inflows in the two years 
following IFRS adoption,  Panel A displays logit results for return contagion in worst returns and Panel B shows the 
OLS results for Liquidity volatility.  All variables are defined as in Table 4 and 6.  Note that only countries that adopt 
IFRS at some point during our sample period of 2001-2010 are included in this analysis.  As in prior analysis I cluster 
standard errors at the country-week level, and include fixed effects at the country-pair and year level.  I report 
standard errors in parentheses under the parameter estimates, with significance based on two-tailed tests.     
Variables 
High %Δ FPI 
post-IFRS 
    




Diff   
Panel A: Worst Returns (Ret < p10) 
 
        
For_Mkt_Worst*Both_IFRS 0.526 ***   0.124 ** 
 
0.402 *** 
  [0.095]     [0.065]   
 
p<0.01   
For_Mkt_Worst 0.994 ***  0.742 **    
 [0.045]   [0.036]     
Both_IFRS  -0.547 ***  -0.421 ***    
 [0.165]   [0.184]     
Bilateral Exports 1.195 ** 
 
0.899 ** 





    Other Controls Yes   Yes  
   N         265,074 
  
       294,863 
    Psuedo R-sqr 18.35% 
  
14.63% 
             
Panel B: Liquidity Volatility 
 
        
For_Mkt_Liqvol*Both_IFRS 0.069 ***   0.017 ** 
 
0.052 *** 
  [0.013]     [0.007]   
 
p<0.01    
For_Mkt_Liqvol 0.046 ***  0.068 ***    
 [0.007]   [0.016]     
Both_IFRS  0.005   0.010 **    
 [0.003]   [0.005]     
Bilateral Exports 0.053 *** 
 
0.048 *** 





    Other Controls Yes   Yes  
   N        265,074 
  
       294,863 
    Adjusted R-sqr 37.65% 
  
39.85% 
             








Cross-border Contagion for High Vs Low IFRS reporting impact 
This table shows return contagion results (Panel A) and results of the relation between firm-level liquidity volatility 
and domestic market and foreign market liquidity for IFRS adopters, partitioned into High and Low IFRS reporting 
impact, based on the established country level “accounting distance” metric (see Yu [2011], Bae et al. [2008]). This 
measures the extent of differences between local GAAP and IFRS, I anticipate those with the greatest accounting 
distance had the biggest improvement in IFRS-induced transparency (and biggest impact on comparability). Panel A 
reports Logit results for worst return contagion, and Panel B reports OLS results for liquidity volatility.  All variables 
are defined as in Table 4 and 6.  Note that only countries that adopt IFRS at some point during our sample period of 
2001-2010 are included in this analysis.  As in prior analysis I cluster standard errors at the country-week level, and 
include fixed effects at the country and year level.  I report robust standard errors in parentheses under the parameter 
estimates, with significance based on two-tailed tests.     
Variables 
High IFRS  
reporting 
impact 






Diff   
Panel A: Worst Returns (Ret < p10) 
        
For_Mkt_Worst*Both_IFRS 0.193 **   0.499 ** 
 
-0.306 ** 
  [0.067]     [0.079]   
 
p<0.05   
For_Mkt_Worst 0.982 *** 
 
0.735 ** 





    Both_IFRS  -0.670 ***  0.131     
 [0.201]   [0.101]     
%Δ FPI post-IFRS  0.399 ** 
 
0.316 ** 





    
Other Controls Yes   Yes     
N         277,168 
  
       
282,768 
    
Psuedo R-sqr 17.31% 
  
13.68% 
             
Panel B: Liquidity Volatility 
 
        
For_Mkt_Liqvol*Both_IFRS 0.031 *   0.074 ** 
 
-0.043 ** 
  [0.016]     [0.025]    p<0.05   
For_Mkt_Liqvol 0.087 *** 
 
0.071 *** 
   
 
[0.021]   [0.016]   
  Both_IFRS -0.051 **  0.009 *    
 [0.025]   [0.004]     
%Δ FPI post-IFRS 0.010 * 
 
0.018 ** 
   
 
[0.005]   [0.008]   
  
Other Controls Yes   Yes     
N 
             
277,168  
  
         
282,768  
    
Adjusted R-sqr 42.35% 
  
49.12% 





Cross-border Contagion for High Vs Low IFRS-Earnings Quality 
This table shows return contagion results (Panel A) and liquidity contagion results (Panel B) partitioned into High and Low 
IFRS-earnings quality groups.  IFRS-earnings quality is defined as the difference between pre-IFRS and post-IFRS country-
level aggregate earnings quality, measured as per Leuz et al. [2003].  I anticipate among those firms in countries with the 
greatest increase in IFRS-earnings quality, as a proxy for transparency, the spread of adverse (liquidity) shocks should be 
mitigated.  Panel A reports Logit results of worst return contagion, and Panel B reports OLS results on correlation between 
foreign liquidity volatility on domestic volatility.  All variables are defined as in Table 4 and 6.  Note that only countries that 
adopt IFRS at some point during our sample period of 2001-2010 are included in this analysis.  As in prior analysis I cluster 
standard errors at the country-week level, and include fixed effects at the country-pair and year level.  I report robust standard 










Diff   
Panel A: Worst Returns (Ret < p10)        
For_Mkt_Worst*Both_IFRS 0.135 *   0.524 *** 
 
-0.389 *** 
  [0.074]     [0.084]   p<0.01   
For_Mkt_Worst 0.934 *** 
 
0.699 ** 
   
 
[0.046]   [0.039]   
  Both_IFRS -0.594 **  -0.012 *    
 [0.234]   [0.007]     
%Δ FPI post-IFRS 0.345 * 
 
0.294 ** 
   
 
[0.211]   [0.134]   
  Other controls Yes   Yes   
N 276,608 
  
         
283,328 
    Psuedo R-sqr 16.97% 
  
14.21% 
     
Panel B: Liquidity Volatility 
 
        
For_Mkt_Liqvol*IFRS 0.033 *   0.074 *** 
 
-0.041 ** 
  [0.017]     [0.023]  p<0.05   
For_Mkt_Liqvol 0.081 ***  0.069 ***    
 [0.013]   [0.015]     
Both_IFRS -0.064 *  0.007 *    
 [0.034]   [0.004]     
%Δ FPI post-IFRS 0.009 * 
 
0.012 ** 
   
 
[0.004]  [0.006]  
  Other controls Yes   Yes  
   N 276,608 
  
283,328 
    Adjusted R-sqr 44.40% 
  
48.12% 
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